

# Measuring Income Inequality of Opportunity

## Focusing on Early Childhood Circumstances

Aman Desai  
CUNY Graduate Center

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## Motivation

**“The rise in inequality in the United States over the last three decades has reached the point that inequality in incomes is causing an unhealthy division in opportunities, and is a threat to our economic growth” (Alan Krueger, Center for American Progress, 12 January 2012)**

Rigorous treatment to measurement of inequality of opportunity (IOp hereafter) is vital from policy perspective.

## Main Results

- About 38-43% of inequality in individual's adult income is unfair.
- About 30-34% of total inequality in an individual's adult income could be attributed to unequal circumstances faced in their childhood up to age 5.

## Contribution

- Categorization of circumstance and effort factors using the age of consent at 18 years.
- Accounting for the role of dynamic complementarity by constructing age-based circumstance sets in measuring the inequality of opportunity.
- Using supervised machine learning to construct counterfactual distribution of adult incomes based on circumstances.

## Related Literature

### Inequality of Opportunity

- Seminal work by Roemer (1993). Success in adult life is considered to be influenced by
  - **Circumstance** : Beyond individual's control, hence for those the individual should not be held responsible and should be compensated for inequalities generated due to those.
  - **Effort** : Individual is in control of their effort and hence should be rewarded in the market economy.

### Technology of Skill Formation

- Based on work by (Cunha and Heckman 2007; Cunha and Heckman 2009)
  - **Dynamic Complementarity** : Returns to investment in human capital at later stage in life is low if investment in early stage is low.

## Inequality of Opportunity

Consider a population  $\mathcal{N} = \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ . Each individual in the population is characterized by a triple  $(y, C, e)$  where  $C \in \Omega^c$ ,  $e \in \Omega^e$ , and  $y = g(C, e)$ , with  $g : \Omega^c \times \Omega^e \Rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ .

- An individual in the population is identified by a *type* and a *tranch*.
- A *type* consists of individuals with the same circumstances beyond their control.
- A *tranch* consists of individuals with the same effort.
- According to Roemer, equality of opportunity is achieved when inequality generated due to differential circumstances is eliminated (between *types*), that is  $F(y|C) = F(y)$ .
- Inequality of opportunity is measured by the extent to which this principle is violated, that is  $F(y|C) \neq F(y)$ .

# Inequality of Opportunity

## Existing Empirical Work

- Several empirical approaches in last twenty years. (Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Menéndez 2007; Pistoletti 2009; Ferreira and Gignoux 2011; Niehues and Peichl 2014; Hufe et al. 2017). The estimated shares of IOp in outcome inequality varies largely from 10% to as high as 70%.
- Usage of machine learning algorithms to model IOp (Brunori, Hufe, and Mahler 2023).
- Fixed set of circumstances where measurement of IOp is dependent on researcher's value judgements.
- Lower bound measures of IOp.

## Technology of Skill Formation

Cunha and Heckman (2007) model technology for skill formation, conceptualized as a law of motion.

$$\omega_{i,t+1} = f(\omega_{i,t}, x_{i,t}, \omega_i^P, \epsilon_{i,t}) \quad (1)$$

- $f(\cdot)$  is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, increasing in all arguments, and concave in  $x_{i,t}$ .
- $x_{i,t}$  is the parental investment for the child  $i$  at age  $t$ .
- $\omega_i^P$  is parental human capital at time  $t$ .
- $\epsilon_{i,t}$  is an iid unobserved individual component.

### Insight

Investment in period  $t+k$  and investment in any prior years  $t$  are always complements as long as  $\omega_{i,t+k}$  and  $x_{i,t+k}$  are complements.



## Idea

If a child can not consent before the age of 18, all the measurable data on the child including her achievements, before she turns 18, can be thought of beyond her control and hence should be considered circumstances.

### Critical Stages in Childhood

To incorporate the idea of dynamic complementarity, age cutoffs are chosen based on critical stages in childhood.

- 2 years : A child starts to speak.
- 5 years : A child enters K-12 system.
- 14 years : A child enters high school.
- 18 years : A child becomes an adult and can consent.

Four datasets are constructed according to four age cutoffs.

i.e.  $C^2 \subseteq C^5 \subseteq C^{14} \subseteq C^{18} \subseteq \Omega^c$

# Data

Ideally, one would have an entire biography of the individual's childhood experiences.

## Analytical Sample

- Database : Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Main Interview, FRM<sup>1</sup>, FIMS<sup>2</sup>).
- Cohorts : 1978-1983.
- Number of Individuals : 639 (SRC sample<sup>3</sup>), 1022 (Full sample<sup>4</sup>).
- Outcome Variables : Individual labor income at age 35 years, Average age adjusted labor income over four years<sup>5</sup>.

The data in consideration is in wide format. Every observation reflects information on measurable factors for an individual over the first 18 years of their life.

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<sup>1</sup>Family Relationship Matrix.

<sup>2</sup>Family Identification Mapping System.

<sup>3</sup>Survey Research Center sample is representative of the US population.

<sup>4</sup>Includes both SRC and SEO samples. The Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) sample includes a disproportionately higher number of poor households.

<sup>5</sup>Individual labor income excludes farm and unincorporated business income. All monetary variables including adult incomes are adjusted to 2018 dollars and individual cross sectional weights from 2013-2019 are used in the analyses.

## Data

Demographic/Family	Monetary/Market	Government/Community
Race, sex of the individual	Family income	Usage of food stamps
Race of the family head, spouse	Childcare cost	Medicaid
Sex of the head	Family wealth	Help from family members, others, insiders
Education of the family head, spouse	Homeownership	Help from the church, community
Occupation of the family head, spouse	Marginal tax rate on family income	Union membership of the family head, spouse
Number of children to father, mother		Paid vacation for family head, spouse
Mother married when individual was born?		Public transport availability
Own a home or rent?		
Number of rooms in family home		
State of residence of family		
Birthweight		
Birth cohort		
Family head, spouse smoker?		
Any outside dependents for head?		

Figure 1: Selected Circumstances

- Choice of circumstances is informed by theory.
- All these circumstances are measured across the first 18 years of a child's life. As I allow these circumstance sets to expand with critical stages in childhood, some circumstances may appear in multiple sets.

## Estimation

**Parametric Specification** (Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Menéndez 2007; Ferreira and Gignoux 2011; Niehues and Peichl 2014)

$$\ln(y_i) = \alpha_0 + \sum_{l=1}^L (\alpha_l C_{i,l}^s) + u_i \quad (2)$$

where  $y$  is the adult income,  $C$  is the collection of factors that are categorized as circumstance belonging to a finite set  $\Omega^c$ ,  $s \in \{2, 5, 14, 18\}$  reflecting four different sets of circumstances based on chosen age cutoffs.

$$\hat{y}_i = \exp \left[ \alpha_0 + \sum_{l=1}^L (\hat{\alpha}_l C_{i,l}^s) \right] \quad (3)$$

## Estimation

The measurement of inequality of opportunity can be thought of as a two-step procedure: first, the actual distribution of  $y_i$  is transformed into a counterfactual distribution (obtain  $\hat{y}_i$ ) that reflects only and fully the unfair inequality in  $y_i$ , while all the fair inequality is removed. In the second step, a measure of inequality<sup>6</sup> is applied to  $\hat{y}_i$ . I use mean logarithmic deviation as an inequality measure<sup>7</sup>.

$$\text{Absolute IOp} = I(\hat{y}_{EA}) \quad (4)$$

where  $I(\hat{y}_{EA})$  is the ex-ante measure of inequality of opportunity.

$$\text{Relative IOp} = \frac{I(\hat{y}_{EA})}{I(y)} \quad (5)$$

The value of relative IOp ranges from 0 to 1. If all income differences are solely due to circumstances, relative IOp will be 1.

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<sup>6</sup>any standard measure of inequality that satisfies anonymity, the principle of transfers, population replication, and scale invariance.

<sup>7</sup> $MLD(x) = \ln(\bar{x}) - \overline{\ln(x)}$ .

## Estimation

Obtaining  $\hat{y}_i$  is a prediction problem.




Figure 2: An Example of a Regression Tree

I use supervised machine learning method : Random Forest, an ensemble of decision trees.

- Better at dealing with high dimensional data, unlike OLS.
- Ensemble of regression trees reduces overfitting.

# Estimation

## Algorithm

I fit the models on training data, tune the hyper parameters on validation data, and then use the best model(with the lowest rmse) on the full data set. The algorithm runs as follows:

- Execute the random forest algorithm and use 5-fold cross validation for hyperparameter tuning. Select the models with hyperparameters that yield the lowest *rmse*. In each fold, the data is divided into  $N_{train} = \frac{4}{5}N$  and  $N_{validation} = \frac{1}{5}N$ .
- Store the prediction functions  $\hat{f}_{train}(\hat{\Omega}^c)$ .
- Obtain final predictions using the full data  $\hat{y} = \hat{f}_{train}(\hat{\Omega}_{fulldata}^c)$ .

## Results

### Selected Descriptive Statistics

Characteristic	Full Sample	SRC Sample
	N = 1,022	N = 639
Individual labor income at age 35 (in log)	10.65 (10.04, 11.08)	10.80 (10.32, 11.20)
Total family income at age 1 (in log)	10.89 (10.34, 11.29)	11.09 (10.58, 11.40)
<b>Sex</b>		
Male	474 (46%)	311 (49%)
Female	548 (54%)	328 (51%)
<b>Race</b>		
White	559 (55%)	554 (87%)
Black	446 (44%)	72 (11%)
AI/AN	8 (0.8%)	6 (0.9%)
Other	9 (0.9%)	7 (1.1%)
<b>Occupation of the head at age 1</b>		
Inap	178 (17%)	60 (9.4%)
Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers	168 (16%)	157 (25%)
Managers and Administrators, except Farm	72 (7.0%)	62 (9.7%)
Sales Workers	22 (2.2%)	20 (3.1%)
Clerical and Kindred Workers	51 (5.0%)	28 (4.4%)
Craftsman and Kindred Workers	219 (21%)	151 (24%)
Operatives, except Transport	128 (13%)	72 (11%)
Transport Equipment Operatives	45 (4.4%)	23 (3.6%)
Laborers, except Farm	41 (4.0%)	24 (3.8%)
Farmers and Farm Managers	13 (1.3%)	12 (1.9%)
Farm Laborers and Farm Foremen	5 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)
Service Workers, except Private Household	79 (7.7%)	28 (4.4%)
Private Household Workers	1 (<0.1%)	
<b>Years of education of the head at age 1</b>	12.00 (11.00, 14.00)	12.06 (12.00, 15.00)
<b>Years of education of the spouse at age 1</b>	12.0 (9.9, 13.1)	12.0 (12.0, 14.0)

<sup>1</sup> Median (Q1, Q3); n (%)

*Note:*

Age refers to the age of the individual when she was a child.

Head refers to the head of the family the child grew up in during the childhood.

Spouse refers to the spouse of the family head.

Figure 3: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables

- Baseline circumstances include individual's sex, race as well as the occupation of the family head, total family income, education of the head and the spouse (all measured when child's age is 1).



## Results

	Full Sample (N = 1022)		SRC sample (N = 639)	
	Absolute IOp	Relative IOp	Absolute IOp	Relative IOp
<b>Outcome : Labor Income at age 35 (Full sample IO = 0.368; SRC sample IO = 0.337)</b>				
Baseline	0.083	0.225	0.065	0.192
Age cutoff at 2 years	0.104	0.283	0.091	0.271
Age cutoff at 5 years	0.125	0.339	0.099	0.294
Age cutoff at 14 years	0.141	0.385	0.113	0.337
Age cutoff at 18 years	0.156	0.426	0.128	0.380
<b>Outcome : Age-adjusted Labor Income (Full sample IO = 0.327; SRC sample IO = 0.308)</b>				
Baseline	0.078	0.239	0.063	0.206
Age cutoff at 2 years	0.106	0.325	0.091	0.296
Age cutoff at 5 years	0.112	0.343	0.094	0.306
Age cutoff at 14 years	0.128	0.391	0.111	0.362
Age cutoff at 18 years	0.140	0.427	0.125	0.406

Figure 4: IOp Estimates

## Results




Figure 5: Relative IOP Estimates Across Age Cutoffs (Using Individual Labor Income at Age 35)

## Results




Figure 6: Relative IOP Estimates Across Age Cutoffs (Using Averaged Age-adjusted Incomes Across 2013-2019 Waves)

## Results




Figure 7: Relative IOp Profiles Across All Age Cutoffs

## Permutation Based Variable Importance Scores (VI scores)




Figure 8: Variable Importance Scores for Circumstances up to Age 2 (Full Sample)

## IOP Estimates Using Selected Circumstances Based on VI scores




Figure 9: Relative IOP Estimates Across Age Cutoffs (Using Averaged Age-adjusted Incomes Across 2013-2019 Waves)

## IOp and Intergenerational Income Elasticity

- Policy discussions have shifted from inequality of outcome to inequality of opportunity, informed by intergenerational mobility (Corak 2013; Chetty et al. 2014).
- IGE is measured as a coefficient in a Galtonian regression of a child's income on parental income.

$$\ln(y_{child}) = \alpha + \beta_{IGE} \ln(y_{parent}) + u \quad (6)$$

- Evidence suggest that the timing of parental income measured may be as or more important than a single measure of parental income (Carneiro et al. 2021).

## IOP and Intergenerational Income Elasticity




Figure 10: IGE Estimates Based on Age Cutoffs

- IGE estimates are obtained using equation 6, where family incomes are averaged over years using critical stages in childhood and child's incomes are age adjusted averages across four waves (2013-2019).
- Pattern looks consistent with the IOP measures.



## Heckman Equation




Figure 11: Source : Heckman Equation

## Conclusion

- I evaluate inequality of opportunity through the lens of childhood circumstances.
- 30–34% of total income inequality can be attributed to unequal circumstances up to age 5.
- I argue that these are upper-bound estimates, given the small number of circumstances that contribute most to unfair inequality.
- From a policy perspective, whether considering ex-post compensation or ex-ante investments (or both), I demonstrate the importance of accounting for dynamic complementarity in measurement rather than relying on a fixed set of circumstances.

Thank you

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## Appendix

### I/O shares in Total Inequality using Gini




Figure 12: Relative I/O Estimates Across Age Cutoffs (Using Individual Labor Income at Age 35)

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## Appendix

### IOP shares in Total Inequality using Gini




Figure 13: Relative IOP Estimates Across Age Cutoffs (Using Averaged Age-adjusted Incomes Across 2013-2019 Waves)

## Appendix

### Regression Trees

A regression tree algorithm makes predictions by stratifying the feature space through a process called *recursive binary splitting*. The goal is to minimize the loss function

$$\sum_{j=1}^{|T|} \sum_{i: x_i \in C_j} (y_i - \hat{y}_{C_j})^2 + \alpha |T| \quad (7)$$

where,  $|T|$  is the number of terminal nodes of the tree,  $C_j$  is the region corresponding to  $j^{th}$  terminal node, and  $\hat{y}_{C_j}$  the predicted value of the outcome variable in the region  $C_j$ , which is the mean value of the observations in the training data in that region.

$\alpha$ , the hyper parameter controls a trade-off between the subtree's complexity and its fit to the training data.



## Appendix

### Random Forest

The process of tree construction is similar to a single decision tree, with some modifications. In each iteration, a tree is constructed using a random subsample. The number of features in these subsamples is determined through hyperparameter tuning. Random sampling in each iteration ensures less correlation among the regression trees constructed. The prediction function in my case becomes

$$\hat{y} = F(C) = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K h_k(C) \quad (8)$$

C stands for circumstances, which are a subset of the full set of circumstances in consideration. C is chosen randomly before constructing each tree. K is the total number of trees.

## Appendix

### Tuned Hyperparameters

		Full Sample (N = 1022)		SRC sample (N = 639)	
Age Cutoffs	Trees	min_n	mtry	min_n	mtry
Outcome : Labor Income at age 35					
2	500	30	9	30	14
5	500	25	24	25	27
10	500	25	43	25	57
12	500	25	57	30	111
14	500	25	74	30	152
16	500	20	69	25	218
18	500	20	84	20	110
Outcome : Age-adjusted Labor Income					
2	500	25	8	30	14
5	500	30	21	35	38
10	500	30	51	30	48
12	500	30	73	35	96
14	500	30	72	25	93
16	500	25	80	25	97
18	500	25	89	20	130

Figure 14: Tuned Hyperparameters

- *mtry*: An integer representing the number of predictors that will be randomly selected at each split during the tree model creation.
- *n\_trees*: An integer representing the number of trees in the ensemble.
- *min\_n*: An integer representing the minimum number of data points a node must contain before it can be split further.